There's been lots of news reported this week concerning the background and experience of the crew in the cockpit of Colgan Air/Continental Connection 3407, the commuter flight that crashed as it approached Buffalo International Airport on February 13 2009.
I'm hardly an aviation expert, but holding a Private Pilot license with Instrument Rating, I do know the difference between the top of an airplane and its bottom ... which might hint at a bit more competence than the cable TV pundits who're pouncing on tiny bits of evidence and cherry-picked data to extract a sensationalized and 100% "news worthy" scandal from a tragedy that claimed the lives of 50 souls.
What is my opinion about the cause of the crash?
My opinion is that it's far too early in the investigation to point fingers and assign blame to the pilot's experience, his checkride performance, his pay scale, his fatigue, the co-pilot's age, gender, pay scale, experience or fatigue to offer a responsible opinion.
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According to The St. Pete Times, Captain Marvin Renslow had failed his Instrument Rating checkride in 1991, his Single-Engine Commercial checkride in 2002, his Commerical Multi-Engine checkride in 2005 and in 2007, both his first checkride in a Saab 340 and a later checkride.
Furthermore, Renslow had just 109 hours flying the Bombardier Dash 8.
Was Captain Renslow really a "substandard" pilot?
Consider that after failing, Renslow passed his Instrument Rating checkride three weeks later, his Single-Engine Commercial checkride a month later, his commercial Mutli-Engine checkride three weeks later ... and passed both Saab 340 checkrides within the month.
An old saying around General Aviation hangars is "Every pilot will, so long as they stay current, or add new licenses or type-ratings, at some point fail a checkride." Another bit of "hangar knowledge" is that airlines start looking at pilots who fail two (identical) checkrides in a row."
Captain Renslow, a graduate of the Gulfstream Training Academy, never failed two back-to-back checkrides. Plus, his flight log indicated he had more than 3000 hours total flight hours of experience.
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I've read reports indicating that the Bombarider's approach speed was much too slow as it approached the ILS (instrument landing system) outer marker, that the crew violated FAA regulations prohibiting cockpit "idle chatter" below 10,000 feet, that the crew was inexperienced with flight procedures in "significant icing conditions", and that Captain Renslow "did the opposite of the right thing" by pulling up on the control yoke when the stick-shaker alerted him to an impending stall ... which caused the airplane to stall, roll inverted and dive nose-first into the ground.
Transcripts from the cockpit revealed that the crew was well aware of icing during their descent, and preliminary reports indicate that the airplane's de-icing systems were found in the "ON" position.
Which to some folks seems to be clear enough proof of pilot error. And inexperience. What else could it be?
But there's more than a difference of syntax between "significant" and "severe" icing.
Severe icing means "The rate of ice accumulation is such that ice protection systems fail to remove the accumulation of ice and ice accumulates in locations not normally prone to icing, such areas aft of protected surfaces and any other areas identified by the manufacturer. Immediate exit from the condition is necessary." AC 91-74, revised (AC 91-74A) on December 31, 2007.
The FAA has no definition including the term "significant icing," and the media overlooks the fact that the NTSB has specifically said they have no reports or evidence of severe icing in the area, and apparently "None of the airliners requested routing or altitude changes to get out of the ice, and nobody even bothered giving a PIREP [Pilot Report] until the controller started soliciting them after the accident." [emphasis added] - source
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Too many more contradictions exist between the factual events and the aspersions aggrandized by armchair media know-it-alls (who, I suspect, would have trouble locating their seat assignment without the assistance of a flight attendant) to list and impugn them all, so I'll stop here ... and hope I've made my point.
Don't necessarily believe everything you hear on the news or see on TV.
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Let's stop slandering the dead and start showing some respect, and a modicum of human decency, by remembering the crew's family, and the burden they're suffering, too.
Let's wait for solid facts, hard evidence and proven answers before we reach a decision about what caused the accident and start considering what can be done in the future to prevent similar catastrophes.
Instead of climbing aboard a cable-channel circus wagon pulled by talking ... mules.
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For further consideration:
- AVWeb
